“too long,
didn’t read”
1
If your plant has run a project that brings machine data to a dashboard, an MES, or the cloud, check whether a small industrial PC in a control cabinet collects and forwards that data. In the scene this post starts with, an integrator installed such a box, it has run without failure since, and nobody has logged in since the acceptance test. The box is a full computer between the machine network and other networks, and its software stays at the version it had on the day of commissioning while new vulnerabilities keep being published. Uptime tells you the box works. It tells you nothing about whether its software is up to date.
2
In that scene, the problem is organizational, not technical. The integrator’s contract has ended, the machine builder supports the machine, plant IT was never told about the box, and maintenance is responsible for availability, not for operating system updates. The first step is therefore an inventory: every edge device, what it runs, who installed it, and one person responsible for its updates. Without that list, nobody can say which devices need an update.
3
The EU Cyber Resilience Act sets cybersecurity requirements for manufacturers of products with digital elements. Its reporting duties apply since September 11, 2026, its remaining obligations from December 11, 2027, and it contains no obligation to retrofit a device you bought years ago. What you can do yourself is a monthly update routine planned around production, documented protective measures where no update exists, and four purchasing questions for the next device. For shared, vendor-neutral device management, the OI4 Alliance has workgroups for Remote Device Management, Industrial Cyber Security, and Open Edge Computing.
Uptime is not
a patch level
Lucas Wolf, Technical Content Manager @Open Industry 4.0 Alliance
November 6th
THE GRAY BOX ON THE DIN RAIL.
Picture a scene. Hall 2, an injection molding line with six machines. In the control cabinet next to the last machine, between the 24-volt power supply and a managed switch, sits a fanless gray box about the size of a paperback. A label maker sticker on the front says “EDGE-02. Do not switch off.” Inside the cabinet door, in a plastic sleeve, there is a printout from 2019 with an IP address, a user name, and a password that someone underlined twice.
The box reads cycle times and barrel temperatures from the six machines over OPC UA and sends them via MQTT to the dashboard the plant manager opens every morning. It has done this reliably for years. It was part of a digitalization project: the integrator delivered, the acceptance protocol was signed, the project folder was archived.
Since then, nobody has logged in. Not because anyone decided against it. There was never a reason. The dashboard works.
This scene is invented. The question it raises is real: does your plant have a box like EDGE-02, and who looks after it?

RUNNING IS NOT THE SAME AS MAINTAINED.
An edge device is an industrial computer close to the machine that collects data, preprocesses it, and forwards it to another system. Depending on the product, it runs a general-purpose operating system such as Linux, plus components like an OPC UA client, an MQTT client, a container runtime, a web interface for configuration, and a remote access component. Each of these is software. For each of them, new vulnerabilities can be published after the day of commissioning.
In the scene, the controllers of the six machines sit in the machine network. EDGE-02 connects two networks: one port toward the machines, one toward the plant network, through which the data reaches the dashboard. Connecting networks is its purpose. It also means that anyone who gains access to the box has a network path into the machine network, which is why OT security has to include edge devices.
The software on EDGE-02 does not change. The list of known vulnerabilities does. Every vulnerability published since commissioning that affects the installed versions stays open until someone installs an update. For management, this does not show up in the usual reports: the box has not failed once, so it appears in no OEE report and on no maintenance plan.
NOBODY’S NAME IS ON IT.
Back in the scene: ask around the plant who is responsible for updating EDGE-02, and you get five answers, each of them correct from its own point of view.
The integrator delivered a project. The contract covered installation and acceptance, not operation, and the engineer who configured the box now works for another company. The machine builder supports the six injection molding machines, not a third-party box in the cabinet next to them. Plant IT manages laptops, servers, and the office network and was not involved in the project, so the box is not in its asset list. Maintenance is responsible for availability. It knows the box is there, but updating a Linux system is not part of its job description. Management signed off the digitalization project as completed, which it is.
Five correct answers add up to one box that nobody owns. You can test this in your own plant with one question per device: who would install an update next Tuesday, and with which login? If nobody can name a person and a login, no update will be installed. The missing piece is not a patch. It is a name.
FIRST, COUNT THEM.
You cannot update what you have not found. The IEC technical report on patch management for industrial systems, IEC TR 62443–2‑3, lists an inventory of the existing environment as part of setting up a patch management program. Four sources help you build that inventory.
Start with the project folders. Every project that brought machine data to a dashboard, an MES, or the cloud needed a component that collects the data, so check for each one whether that component is a separate device. Purchase orders and acceptance protocols also name the supplier, which a network scan cannot tell you.
Then look at the switches. The address tables of managed switches list every device that communicates through them, and the first half of a MAC address identifies the manufacturer of the network interface. Do this together with IT. An active scan sends requests to every device on the network, so agree with your machine builders beforehand whether their controllers tolerate it in production.


At the next planned shutdown, open the cabinets. Maintenance walks through with a flashlight and a phone camera, and a photo of the type plate is enough for now.
Finally, ask the companies that built your lines. Integrators and machine builders can tell you which computers they installed and under which contract.
For each device, write down the same seven things: location, manufacturer and model, operating system or firmware version if you can read it, what it connects to (machines, networks, cloud endpoints), who installed it, whether a support contract or announced end of support exists, and one person responsible for updates.
The last column is the one that matters. A spreadsheet with forty rows and no names is an inventory. The same spreadsheet with forty names is a plan.
AN UPDATE ROUTINE THAT FITS A SHIFT PLAN.
The same IEC report describes patch management as a set of processes: watching for releases, deciding which patch goes to which system, deciding whether to test first, choosing when to install, and tracking that it worked. For a plant with a few dozen edge devices, that translates into five steps.
First, watch. For every manufacturer on your list, find out where they publish security advisories, and let one named person check them on a fixed day each month.
Deciding comes next, because not every patch is urgent. A flaw in a web interface that is reachable only from a locked maintenance network is not the same as a flaw in the remote access component that faces the internet.
Before the first update, take a full image of the box and store the configuration export next to it. If you have an identical spare, test there. If not, start with the least critical line.
Install in a window you already have: planned maintenance, a shift change, a weekend. If a box only reads and forwards data, a restart interrupts the data stream to the dashboard. Check per box whether anything in production depends on it, for example setpoints it writes back to a machine. If so, plan the restart like any other intervention in the process.
Afterwards, record the date, the version before and after, and who did it. Three more columns in the same spreadsheet.
Sometimes there is no update. The vendor no longer exists, the hardware has reached its announced end of life, or the box is part of a validated system you cannot change without requalification. Then document what the box can reach, close services nobody uses, switch off remote access until someone needs it, replace default passwords, and put the device on the replacement list with a date. “We cannot patch this, so we restricted its connections and replace it in the third quarter” is a documented decision with an owner and a deadline.
WHAT THE CYBER RESILIENCE ACT WILL AND WON’T DO.
The Cyber Resilience Act, Regulation (EU) 2024/2847, sets cybersecurity requirements for products with digital elements made available on the EU market. It entered into force on December 10, 2024. Since September 11, 2026, manufacturers must report actively exploited vulnerabilities and severe incidents, including for products already on the market. The essential requirements and the remaining manufacturer obligations apply from December 11, 2027. For an introduction, see our webinar on the EU Cyber Resilience Act.
One of those obligations is the support period, the time during which a manufacturer must provide security updates. As a rule it is at least five years, shorter only if the product is expected to be used for less time. The Commission’s guidance from July 2026 adds that five years is not a universal standard: a product with a longer expected life may need longer support. The end date has to be communicated to users.
Who is affected? Manufacturers of edge devices are addressed as manufacturers of products with digital elements. Whether a machine builder is addressed for a machine depends on whether the machine counts as a product with digital elements, and integrators who combine hardware with their own software and deliver it as a product should clarify whether they take on manufacturer duties. Both are questions for legal counsel. How remote maintenance, software updates, and audit trails were implemented for CRA compliance in an industrial project was the topic of our webinar CRA in Practice. Operators that only use a device are not among the parties the CRA places obligations on, and the regulation contains no obligation to bring a device from 2019 up to its new requirements. The inventory and the names stay your job.
From the CRA requirements you can derive four questions for your next purchase. How are updates delivered, and can our own staff install them without a service visit? When does the support period end, and where is that written? Where do you publish security advisories? Can we manage the device with a tool of our choice, or only through your portal?
SIX VENDORS, SIX PORTALS.
The last purchasing question is the one a single plant cannot answer for itself. Forty edge devices from six vendors can mean six management portals, six logins, six update procedures, and six ways to set up remote access. Every additional tool adds a login, a procedure, and a person who needs to know both.
One tool for devices from several vendors requires common interfaces for onboarding, monitoring, and updating that every manufacturer supports. No operator can define them alone, and no single vendor can make the others adopt them. That is pre-competitive work. In the OI4 Alliance, Open Edge Computing compliance defines requirements for interoperable edge solutions, and our hackathon on public key infrastructures worked on edge security, secure MQTT communication, and certificate lifecycle management.

BACK TO HALL 2.
Imagine EDGE-02 six months from now. The printout in the cabinet door is gone, and the password lives in the plant’s password manager. The sticker on the front has a second line: an owner’s name and the date of the next check. The box still feeds the dashboard every morning. From the outside, nothing has changed. That is the point.
You can start tomorrow afternoon without a budget. Take one hall, one flashlight, and a spreadsheet with the seven columns from above. Count the edge devices and fill in the last column. Every row without a name goes on the agenda of your next meeting with IT and maintenance.
Making forty devices from six vendors manageable in one way is the part no plant solves on its own. This is what the Open Industry 4.0 Alliance is for. Operators, machine builders, technology providers, and integrators work together there in the pre-competitive space, on questions like the ones in this post: which interfaces vendors should support, how updates and remote access can work across manufacturers, and what an operator can require when buying.
The work happens in projects with a defined goal and in demonstrators, where members show on real hardware that devices from different vendors work together. Around that sits a network of experts from operators, machine builders, and technology providers. Bring your inventory or your purchasing questions, discuss them with people who deal with the same questions in their own companies, and see which solutions others have already tested. You can take part as a project partner without being a member.
